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TALES FROM THE FRONT:
REFLECTIONS OF A CATHOLIC
UNIVERSITY ADMINISTRATOR ON
SPIRITUALITY AND LEADERSHIP

ALVEN NEIMAN
University of Notre Dame

Many good books on the theory and practice of the Catholic university have
been published. The modest aim here is not to try to otitdo or replace them,
but only to provide something of an autobiographical accoutit and musings
of one who has served as a director of a humanities program at Notre Dame
for over 15 years. The hope is that "Tales From the Front" will resonate
with some readers, or at least lead them to reflect upon the challenges of
their own work in Catholic teaching or administration.

R

ecent debate over higher education in America makes it seem as if our
colleges and universities are now battlegrounds rather than institutions
of teaching and leaming. Perhaps the work most responsible for generating
the dozens of books that have appeared over the past decade conceming the
difficulties in higher leaming is Bloom's The Closing of the American Mind
(1987). Bloom suggests that even our most elite universities have failed
democracy and impoverished the souls of today's students. Other recent
books have similarly referred to the moral collapse of the university, the university as a place guilty of killing the spirit, and the university in ruins
(Readings, 1986; Smith 1990; Wilshire 1990). In a profound series of Gifford
lectures, the Catholic philosopher Maclntyre (1990) has written of the moral
and philosophical incoherence of the modem university, and elsewhere has
traced the problem to what he perceives as a similar incoherence in our culture at large. Perhaps, as Kerr (1963) hinted over 30 years ago, our universities are trying to do too many things, be too many things for too many people, and thus, risk pleasing no one.
As this debate over the university rages, another cultural phenomenon
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has appeared, a new yearning among the general public for spirituality which
Fordham educational theorist Elias (1991) has called the "Fourth Great
Awakening" in American history, a period similar to the awakenings of the
desire for God that occurred in the 17th, 18th, and 19th centuries. Recently
Newsweek supported and augmented Elias's analysis when it ran a cover
story entitled "Spirituality for Sale?" The article focused on the success of
popular "spiritual gurus" such as Chopra and others who have sold millions
of books to Americans who perceive "a hole in their soul," a deep spiritual
emptiness, and who seek relief. The success on best seller lists by pop gurus
such as Chopra, Estes, More, Redfield, and many others raises the following
questions: How should educators respond to Elias's awakening? Does its
existence provide support for claims made by authors such as Bloom concerning the deficiencies of our educational institutions? Is Bloom right that
our schooling impoverishes souls? Can a more intelligent spirituality than
that found in the marketplace, one which taps into legitimate religious traditions and resists becoming consumerized, be taught? If so, who should teach
it? Is it, at least in part, the job of the college or university to teach it?
These questions should be especially important to those of us who work
in, and believe in, the mission of Catholic universities. Teachers and administrators in Catholic schools of all types, including the Catholic university,
face special challenges and responsibilities above and beyond those found
within secular universities. On the one hand, we must continue to struggle
with the kind of challenge raised by authors such as Woolf, who insist that
the very idea of a "Catholic university" is a contradiction in terms.
Universities, Woolf (1969) argues, should resemble their 19th-century
German counterparts in sponsoring research completely unfettered from faith
by pure scientific reason. Yet, according to Woolf, Catholicism insists upon
a faith commitment to various beliefs and practices. On the other hand, we
must pay attention to the lessons that can be found in the work of authors
such as the Protestant scholar Marsden, whose magisterial The Soul of the
American University (1994) demonstrates the way in which, over the course
of the last hundred years, the universities we tend to consider our most elite
have, with the very best intentions, lost their religious dimension almost
entirely in a rush toward 19th-century German professionalism, specialization, and expertise. We must wonder if these latter phenomena are consistent
with truly liberal education. As Catholic educators, we should pay close
attention to the profound concem for the integrity of "whole" human beings,
body, mind, and spirit, expressed by Pope John Paul II in Ex Cordi Ecclesiae
(1990). Can a university even partially modeled after the classical German
research institution foster spirituality?
A number of profound works by Catholic authors have already begun to
appear, works that address problems and prospects for the Catholic university from historical, sociological, theological, and philosophical points of view
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(Baxter & Bauerschmidt, 1995; Berthold, 1991; Gleason, 1995; O'Brien,
1994). Those looking for the necessary theoretical tools for dealing with what
Baxter & Bauerschmidt (1995) have referred to as "the dilemma of Catholics
in the academy" should certainly consult these texts. My remarks are not
meant to supplant what can be found in them. Rather, my goal is simply to
describe the ways in which my own experiences, first as a graduate student
and later as a teacher, scholar, and administrator in a Catholic university have
shaped my own conception of, and mode of response to, these issues. Perhaps
my "tales from the front" will prove instructive for others in similar circumstances, at least stimulating further thought among those in positions similar
to mine who face similar problems and questions.
In what immediately follows, however, I preface my personal story and
reflections with a description of what I take to be the current cultural and
social situation of the university, especially those universities which either
are established research institutions or are seeking, as a number of Catholic
universities are, to become such. I am aware that my description will appear
to some to be a caricature. But even if it is exaggerated, exaggeration sometimes has its purpose in highlighting trends or illuminating at least part of
what is going on. I believe that my description of the university and its current cultural situation does have its merits as at least a partly objective
account.

CULTURAL CONTEXT OF THE UNIVERSITY:
TECHNOPOLY
If writers such as the great Christian sociologist Ellul (1968) are on the mark,
we live today in an age which Postman (1993) has described as a technopoly.
In a technopoly, culture surrenders to technology. Unlike past ages, where
our use of technology was kept in its place by various political, moral, and
rehgious traditions, technology now operates independently of, in fact supersedes, tradition. As Ellul states, technique now "absorbs the sacred and has,
in fact, become the sacred" (1968, p. 372). It is no longer the case that technology is neither good nor bad, only our use of it makes it so. What, then,
does Ellul mean by the word technique as it operates within technopoly?
Here one might point to what the philosopher Barrett (1979) has called "the
illusion of technique"; the idea that we might find, in education and elsewhere, self-interpreting, error-proof, perhaps values-neutral rules, methods,
or recipes that will free us from the constraints of what Aristotle referred to
as phronesis: fallible, yet unavoidable, human judgment. For now our use of
technique prescribes its own value systems, and, in fact, makes it harder and
harder to understand other, older systems that might challenge the imperatives of technopoly. For Ellul, in a technopoly, technology humiliates our
words (1985). It co-opts older concepts from more traditional ways of think-
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ing, making their earlier meanings opaque or meaningless to the modem ear.
How does technopoly operate within educational institutions (Neiman,
1998)? How has it infected our universities? Educational philosopher
Noddings (1992) has referred to the error of methodolatry within pre-college
and pre-university schooling, but her remarks are not irrelevant to higher
education. Noddings describes a number of ways in which schools fall prey
to the illusion of technique. For example, much educational research has
gone into the search for "teaching programs" that work in such a way to be
almost immune to human error, i.e., that avoid the use of phronesis on the
part of the teacher. The search for teacher-proof methods of schooling, however, can only be taken seriously if intelligence, once symbolic of any number of different forms of artful thought and feeling, becomes understood as
the mere ability to follow recipes. Thus, we lose sight of traditional ideas of
intelligence as art. But once these traditional educational ideas are gone,
along with the traditions in which they once made sense, there is little conceptual space left to oppose the imperatives of the machine and the market.
Education becomes the ability to succeed efficiently and economically. To
meet the challenge of other nations in the marketplace unconsciously
becomes the only sensible objective of schooling about which we can begin
to reach a consensus. It begins to sound like the essence of common sense.
Consider an example of educational technique at work within technopoly: Computer technology. Postman (1993) argues, has begun to redefine
humans as "information processors," and nature itself as information to be
processed. "The fundamental message of the computer is that we are
machines" (Postman, 1993, p. 111). At prestigious institutions of leaming,
the growing demand that teachers in the humanities "do research" leads to
the building of high-tech classrooms full of gadgets which are supposed to
take over more and more of the teaching load. Moreover, wacky ideas such
as "Socrates gone virtual" are taken more and more seriously as legitimate
candidates to replace the older, more traditional ideal of the face-to-face, dialogical classroom which was once essential to the idea of liberal education.
In a technopoly, it seems that Socrates, as well as his students, can simply
stay home and access each other over the Intemet! Something important is
lost here, something that would be obvious to anyone for whom Socrates'
own understanding of words such as teaching and leaming still make some
sense.
A related example: Consider what the growing rush to professionalism,
specialization, and expertise has done to our traditional idea of colleges and
universities as communities of leaming. Professors residing at the same institution of higher leaming have less and less to say to each other conceming
the nature of their academic interests. Even for those within the same
departments, it becomes harder and harder to understand what one's colleagues are talking about. In fact, the demand for specialized publications
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and concomitant desire for promotion and tenure make it less and less enticing or profitable even to try to understand each other. One enters one's faculty office building to find room after room of professors oblivious to one
another, hunched over their computers, writing and reading the work which
appears in one's own joumals, at one's own conferences, almost always work
done by and for those outside one's own institution. The trend has been countered, with some success, by the creation of specialized institutes of leaming
within various institutions, but this does not do much to impede the imperatives of technopoly. As Maclntyre (1988) notes, the possibility that teachers
within a university might deal in common with the whole of learning is made
to appear less and less sensible every day.
Finally, consider the effect on undergraduate students. How could such a
state of affairs yield anything but a curriculum which consists of modules of
disconnected information, each consisting of reports of specialized research?
Within the major, perhaps, one begins an initiation into the world of research:
Courses once taught by well-rounded teacher-leamers are replaced by
watered-down versions of one's latest book or article, materials that are more
or less unintelligible to students who have not given themselves over to the
professor's specific area of expertise. Where, then, is the wholeness, the connectedness, of leaming that is, at least in part, constitutive of spirituality?

ENTRY INTO THE LIFE OF
A CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY:
A GRADUATE STUDENT EXPERIENCE
In 1973,1 entered the graduate program in philosophy at the University of
Notre Dame, where I now direct our Core Course in the College of Arts and
Letters. In retrospect, I realize that my understanding of what I was getting
into was simplistic if not naive. As an undergraduate at a non-Catholic, state
supported university of very modest means, I had become interested in what
philosophers such as Socrates referred to as the love of and quest for wisdom.
Works such as the Platonic dialogues had initiated me into a tradition of
inquiry partially oriented around liberal education's famous trio of questions:
1) Who am I? 2) How ought I to live? and 3) If I live in such a way, what can
I hope for? While I had no sustaining philosophy of life to rely on at the time,
I noticed that many around me had managed to become "tme believers" in
any number of such philosophies. My problem as a philosophy student was
that these people, while each quite certain of the truth of their beliefs and
practices, disagreed among themselves as to what those truths were.
Thus, I became interested in the skeptical current that mns alongside the
philosophical tradition I was studying, alongside those who thought they had
found answers to Kant's questions (Hiley, 1988). In graduate school, I found
a discipline, theory of knowledge, or epistemology, which seemed to address
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the challenge of the skeptics: What is knowledge? What is rationahty? What
can we know for certain? What do we have a right to believe? Are there any
beliefs, any types of faith, we can trust in with confidence? In my doctoral
studies I examined both skepticism and those who had responded to it. In the
course of my work I came across, almost in spite of myself, some of St.
Augustine's writings which anticipated and responded to the type of skeptical challenge most famously raised in Descartes' Meditations (1963). These
works included Augustine's Confessions (1975), his treatise against skeptical
doubt. Against the Academics (1951), as well as his work on "the ethics of
belief," On the Utility^ of Believing (1948).
But, alas, this was as yet an almost purely theoretical, intellectual quest.
It was some time before I began to understand how to put this theory into personal, educational practice. As I now see it, my life as an apprentice to the
craft of professional philosophy existed in a severe tension with my life as,
to use the phrase of the Danish philosopher Kierkegaard, "an existing individual." In retrospect, it now seems to me that technopoly in the academy all
too often pushes issues of life and death, issues that provide the real motivation for all inquiry, to the background, making these existential concems
transparent or unconscious, so that the very point of it all gets lost. What
begins as a search for truth, for God, becomes a romance with technique, the
methods and jargon of one s expertise.

INITIATION INTO THE CORE COURSE
Among the greatest blessings of my academic life was an offer I received in
the summer of 1979 to participate in the founding of our College's Core
Course. Core, as newly mandated by the College Council, was to be a yearlong, interdisciplinary course, with a syllabus studied in common by all of
our sophomores in seminars of 18 or fewer students. The syllabus was to be
divided into sections on nature and society in the fall semester, the self and
God in the spring. The objectives of the course, according to our mandate,
were four: 1) introduction to formative works and ideas; 2) introduction to
the learning resources of the College; 3) consideration of important value
questions; 4) consideration of the various ways of knowing available within
the University. For me, the last objective has been most important and in
many ways encompasses the first three. This aspect of the course has helped
me break free from a number of disabilities which I believe were fostered by
my apprenticeship into the professional life of philosophy.
In investigating this objective, I was most impressed by the remark of a
wise colleague. Core, he said, would serve to "inoculate" sophomores, before
they choose their majors, against the "hubris" of specialization. When I heard
this remark, I was, happily enough, reading Newman's classic work The Idea
of a University (1982) and moving away from epistemology as a field of
study to the philosophy of education. In his book, Newman spoke of a sec-

Alven Neimann^ALES FROM THE FRONT

75

ond kind of philosophy for which my previous study had hardly prepared me,
a "habit of mind" which aimed at the integration of the various, sometimes
disjointed, disciplinary points of view with which university students are
confronted. This was a way of thinking that, as it tumed out, powerfully and
intentionally cut against the increasingly narrow, jargon-ridden imperatives
of my own graduate training, as well as at least most other graduate apprenticeships in the modern research university.
In order to get a clearer sense of how Newman's philosophy works, I now
look at Core as it is presently constituted. I want to indicate how, at least as
I teach it, the syllabus helps with the inoculation my colleague spoke of I
write "at least as I teach it" because in a course as large as ours, now enrolling
over 700 students a year in approximately 40 sections, meant somehow to
represent an entire College composed of 18 departments in the humanities,
fine arts, and social sciences, the meaning and purpose of what we do must
constantly be renegotiated among those who teach the course, members of
our yearly curriculum committees, the higher administration, and faculty, as
well as students as a whole. Even a director of a course like this cannot force
teachers to stress one or several possible objectives over others. But he can
teach the course as he wishes and leam from it accordingly.
So, the section on nature encourages discussion of 1) an anthropological
account of the nature myths of a pre-agricultural society; 2) Genesis; 3)
Aristotle's concept of teleology in natural objects as well as artifacts; 4)
Darwin's theory of evolution; 5) transcendentalist and romantic literary reactions to the modem scientific worldview: and 6) ways in which visual art has
represented the natural world throughout time. Thus, a number of "ways of
knowing" nature, different in form and result, are inevitably compared and
contrasted, with similarities and tensions brought to the fore. Do the perspectives of myth, theology, science, art, poetry, etc., taken as a whole, provide a clearer, or more confusing, picture of the natural world than any one
area by itself? If confusions arise, how can they be overcome? Moreover, in
considering "questions of value," e.g., cloning, technology, the environmental crisis, we inevitably consider how economic and other social and cultural
contexts affect our view of, and activity within, the world around us. Perhaps
the ultimate lesson of the section is that no one viewpoint that one might cultivate within an academic major can do justice to the phenomena in question.
Hence, an inoculation has occurred.
Core is not always enacted with ease. Core is a course that cannot successfully be taught from the perspective of any one scholar's expertise. Thus,
the course cannot be one in which the knowledge of "one who knows" is simply transmitted into the minds of students. For students used to judging
courses according to the quality of their lecture notes, the experience of Core
can come as quite a shock and can be quite fmstrating. But once these students are led to understand the value of such fmstration, the point of the
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course at which one which begins, rather than ends, the search for knowledge
and encourages students to educate each other through questioning and dialogue. Core often becomes a high point of course work in the College.
Faculty, as well as students, are often surprised and fmstrated by their
initial experiences with Core. Often they are eventually "liberated" from
their own technical expertise. Especially valuable in this regard are our
Friday faculty seminars, where the staff members hold their own discussions
of the materials they will take up with students the following week. I vividly remember my initial experiences in these seminars, how I, imbued with the
"hubris" of analytic philosophy, came to the shocking realization that I might
have something to leam about nature, society, the self, and God from theologians, English teachers, artists and art professors, social scientists, and even
philosophers from fields other than the theory of knowledge. As director of
the course, I have since watched a similar process occur in other often less
obstinate but nonetheless well-specialized teachers. Any number of our current and past faculty will attest that the experience of Core opened up a new
world to them. Or perhaps it is an old world that technopoly had previously
hidden from their view!
Earlier I spoke about the way technopoly has changed our understanding
of the idea of universities as communities of leaming. I owe Core, my work
with similarly committed faculty, as well as my students, a great debt for
making a more traditional and venerable notion of such communities come
alive for me. It is not that more specialized communities, research communities, even Intemet communities are, in themselves, unwelcome or evil.
Rather, my point is that the growing hegemony of these latter communities
must not be allowed to wipe out communities such as I have found within
Core. For these, I believe, point the way toward the heart and soul of a great
and ancient tradition of liberal education which is in danger of becoming
unintelligible, that tradition which Bloom describes, admittedly in an unnecessarily polemical and anti-democratic manner, as composed of "those who
seek the truth, of the men (sic) who desire to know...the true friends" (Bloom
1987, p. 381). Here perhaps wisdom is a better word for modem ears than
tmth, in order to clarify what is being sought within these Core-inspired
groups of ours.

BEYOND CORE?
In a paper entitled "Leaming to Live" the Trappist monk Merton (1992) suggests, in perhaps his only paper devoted entirely and systematically to education, that the university has, at its best, a monastic quality. The classical tradition and wisdom of monasticism is no longer easily intelligible to us, perhaps due to the imperatives of technopoly. In any event, through ongoing visits with the Trappist community at New Melleray Abbey in Dubuque, Iowa,
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and related reading, research, and practice, I have begun to wonder if, beyond
the imperatives of "Scholasticism," "Platonism," and "Pragmatism" as
philosophies of education and even beyond what Newman's vision can do for
those of us who seek unity within the university, monastic tradition provides
a salutary model.
I have already suggested how Newman's philosophy provides something
of a spiritual component insofar as it encourages connection rather than disparity, a unified rather than fragmented vision, a sort of wisdom rather than
mere knowledge. Still I wonder if it sufficiently addresses the concems about
the university that I have been discussing. In this regard, a major issue has to
do with the way we view intelligence in higher leaming. Does not even
Newman's philosophical habit of mind falsely oppose the head to the heart,
place reason over feeling, knowledge over desire? Are not both ends of these
supposed dichotomies equally important? Can Newman s ideas by themselves allow educators to explode these false dualisms? In monastic tradition,
a model of intelligence and inquiry is proposed that attempts to merge these
extremes; the model is based in part on Augustine's "I believe in order to
understand" but also on the Cistercian formula "I believe in order to experience." First, I, not just a disembodied mind but a fiesh and blood creature,
cannot but believe if I am to understand. In Book VI, 5 of Confessions,
Augustine states this point beautifully.
Thus, O Lord, you laid your gentle most merciful finger on my heart and set
my thoughts in order, for I began to realize that I believed countless things
which I had never seen or which had taken place when I was not there to
see—so many events in the history of the world, so many facts about places
and towns which I had never seen, and so much that I believed on the word
of friends or doctors or various other people. Unless we took these things
on trust, we should accomplish absolutely nothing in this life. Most of all it
came home to me how firm and unshakeable was the faith which told me
who my parents were, because I could never have known this unless I
believed what I was told. (Augustine, 1975, pp. 116-117)
Kuhn (1962), the distinguished philosopher and historian of science, has
recently made a similar point when he notes that all teaching and leaming,
even in supposedly so rational a field as natural science, proceeds within
"paradigms." If Kuhn is right, our very understanding of reason must be
reconceptualized to allow for faith (Neiman, 1984).
This is at least part of what St. Bemard had in mind in providing one of
the greatest acts of spiritual leadership we know of, fostering in the 12th century, according to Jean LeClercq (1964), a culture which stressed both the
love of leaming and the desire for God. Bemard is sometimes portrayed in
his dispute with the scholastic theologian Peter Abelard as a reactionary
zealot. Occasionally, this view is stretched to the point that Bemard's Abelard
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is made to look something like Galileo's grandfather, a martyr in pursuit of
logic, reason, and tmth, hounded by monastics who, instead, favored irrationality and unbridled emotion. Historian Ferrulo (1985), however, has
painted a far different view. Could it not be that it was not reason itself that
Bernard opposed in Abelard, and in Scholastic Theology at the University of
Paris, but a certain model of reason that could all too easily be co-opted in
later centuries by Descartes and others in the service of heartless technique?
Norris (1997), in her recent book The Cloister Walk, presents a wonderfully wise yet accessible delimitation of "monastic reason," a way of thinking and living that merges cult and grammar in such a way as to counteract
the growing literalism inherent in our ways of thinking, seeing, and feeling.
For Norris, monasticism incorporates a number of spiritual disciplines or
exercises which make us more poetic, more open to metaphor as a mode of
knowing, more humble, attentive, and serene in the face of the miracle and
mystery of existence. Scholarship today too often evacuates the world of
mystery. Norris's monks, LeClercq's monastic culture, and Merton's education for life all teach us that reason, properly employed, is compatible with
both mystery and reverence. Monastic spiritual exercises, according to
Norris, also help us see time as a friend rather than an enemy; they may be
of benefit to those of us who believe that what the contemporary university
often really teaches its students, beyond the illusion of technique, is that the
modem "rat race" is perfectly normal and acceptable, that the inability to live
and thrive in the race is a sign of weakness rather than strength. They might
also provide, when coupled with the kind of leaming fostered by Newman's
philosophy, a kind of "spiritual intelligence" that would both awaken the
heart's desire and point it beyond the simplistic gurus of the marketplace.
In "Learning to Live" and elsewhere, Merton suggests that he received
his first taste of the ancient discipline of monastic "lectio" or spiritual reading, meditation, and contemplation not in the monastery but in the English
classes of Mark Van Doren, his teacher at Columbia. There are still professors at my institution who resemble Van Doren in their teaching and mode of
relating to their students, but they were typically trained and hired long ago.
One wonders if these teachers would receive tenure now at our elite universities, or even be hired. One wonders how many Van Dorens are to be found
in the new and upcoming generations of the professorate.
There are those who would claim that whatever wisdom or serenity
monastic disciplines provide should be obtained outside the university classroom, perhaps in dorms, in the Mass, or through campus ministry. But this
answer fails to take into account the fact that monastic leaming is meant to
reconcile reason and faith within one unified life of inquiry: credo ut intelligiam, credo ut expectari. Within the monastic tradition this means: I believe
in the imperatives of the heart and mind, and I believe that the teaching and
leaming which truly incorporate faith cannot help but, with the grace of God,
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obtain what the human person desires above all else. If Newman's philosophy teaches the integration of the academic disciplines, monasticism suggests a mode of learning, within the Catholic university at least, that brings
cult, the poetry of the liturgy, somehow into the classroom, and classroom
leaming outside into the cult. If writers such as Pieper, as well as Norris and
LeClercq, are right, only an academic education immersed and intrinsically
related to the very center of religious ritual and worship can activate the
whole learner, body, mind, and spirit, in search of a wisdom much more profound than the disconnected information technopoly provides (Pieper, 1964).
But, once again, such an education would supersede Newman's in its depth
and rationale.
This leaves us with the question of how one might instantiate not only
Newman's vision more fully into the university, but also the monastic doctrine of belief and experience. Let us grant that Aquinas has taught the
Church and its educators how to inquire in a faith-filled manner. But how
might aspects of monastic spiritual discipline be taught and not just spoken
about? How might an education whose aim is not simply faith as belief or
understanding, but also experience, to be taught and leamed? Palmer, among
others, has taken us some part of the way in this regard. Palmer's (1983) ecumenical use of a curriculum in which "we know as we are known" is a real
contribution toward answering this question. But if Maclntyre (1988) is right
about inquiry, true mastery is best taught within the various classical religious traditions, and not through some secularized version that inevitably
waters down the production of true spiritual mastery. Surely there are difficult issues of church and state here for universities that wish to avoid the
adjective Catholic. But this is not our worry.
Faced with technopoly and a century of unprecedented horrors, we need
a Catholic university which fearlessly connects to its past, but also faces the
needs of the time as well as the future. As Newman taught us in his On the
Development of Doctrine (1992), all traditions must evolve, and the Catholic
tradition is no exception. The Catholic tradition is still faced, over 30 years
after Vatican II, with the task of dealing with democracy and its issues of justice as well as science, technology, genocide, and the Holocaust. What I especially like about Norris's book is the manner in which she provides educators
with a sense of how important aspects of this reconstruction might work. In
the midst of a society that thrives on the literal, she reminds us of the role of
metaphor and mystery not simply in monastic leaming, but in any true leaming at all. Through metaphor, evolution of doctrine begins to appear more
natural.
Our tradition must evolve not simply by adapting to the surrounding culture; it must, in the spirit of St. Augustine and St. Bernard, Merton and
Newman, Dorothy Day and Mother Theresa, bear witness against what is
wrong in our midst as well as bear witness for what is right. However, to do
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this, our educators must have the confidence and courage, as well as the
humility, compassion and fear of God, necessary to swim against the tide
where not doing so may mean shipwreck.
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